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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO CROSS APPEAL
Despite the fact that Defendants do not actually dispute that the principal amount
due and owing under the Trust Deed is $245,590.45 or that the interest rate is 9.5%, they
nevertheless ask this Court to affirm the trial court's decision that the Trust Deed is
invalid on the "alternate basis" that Franklin did not call a records custodian to testify at
trial as to this undisputed amount and interest rate. (Def. Br. at 37). Franklin was not
required to offer such additional evidence in order to proceed with its judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. In an abundance of caution, however, Franklin
moved the trial court to re-open the trial in order to allow it to offer additional evidence
of the principal amount and interest rate in the event the trial court determined that such
additional evidence was needed. The trial court, in its discretion, granted Franklin's
Motion to Re-Open. The trial court ultimately ruled that the Trust Deed was invalid and,
consequently, the Motion was rendered moot.
In their cross appeal, Defendants have failed to sustain their burden of
demonstrating that the trial court's granting of the Motion was an abuse of discretion. To
the contrary, to the extent any additional evidence is needed, the re-opening of the trial to
allow for the presentation of such evidence is just and fair to both Franklin and
Defendants. This Court should affirm the trial court's granting of the Motion.

4841-3106-0743.1
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ARGUMENT
Utah courts have "long held" that "where one of two innocent parties must suffer a
loss because of the misconduct of the third . . . 5 the law generally leans towards placing
the loss upon the one who made the choice and created the circumstance out of which the
loss came about." SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT App 31, f 23, 177 P.3d 629. In
this case, Blaine "made the choice" to grant Shirley unfettered authority over their
personal and business finances and thereby "created the circumstances" that allowed
Shirley to engage in the alleged "wrongful acts" of which he complains. Blaine, not
Franklin, should bear any loss related to his choice and the circumstances he created.
L

FRANKLIN SATISIFIED ITS MARSHALING BURDEN.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants incorrectly argue that Franklin failed to

satisfy its marshaling burden. (Def. Br. at 12). The trial court did not rule that the Trust
Agreement and/or the General Durable POA were ambiguous. Consequently, the trial
court's interpretation of Section 11.1 of the Trust Deed and the POA are legal
conclusions which are reviewed by this Court for correctness.

They are not "fact-

sensitive" and Franklin is not required to marshal the evidence in support of them.
Moreover, the trial court failed to address Franklin's argument that Shirley had actual
authority to execute the Trust Deed pursuant to Section 4.2 of the Trust Agreement. This
Court may interpret Section 4.2 as a matter of law and Franklin is not required to marshal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the evidence in connection with this argument. Similarly, the trial court failed to address
Franklin's argument that the Trust Deed is valid under the former Utah Code Ann. § 757-406. Given that matters of statutory construction also are questions of law, Franklin is
not required to marshal the evidence in connection with this argument. Finally, Franklin
did marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact related to its
actual, apparent and/or implied authority claims, its ratification claim, and its claim that
the Trust Deed is a valid lien on Shirley's one-half interest in the Property.
II.

SECTION 4.2 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT GAVE SHIRLEY ACTUAL
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE WARRANTY DEED.
As trustor of the Trust, Shirley reserved to herself the power to withdraw the

Property from the Trust at any time, with or without notice to Blaine, pursuant to Section
4.2 of the Trust Agreement, which provides:
We each reserve to ourselves the following powers:
(a)
the right to withdraw property from this Trust in any
amount and at any time upon giving reasonable notice in
writing to any one or more of the Trustees. Such notice is
required only if we are not then serving as a Trustee of this
Trust.
Defendants do not dispute that the Trust Agreement does not limit the type or
amount of trust property that can be withdrawn pursuant to Section 4.2.

Rather,

Defendants argue that "both Shirley and Blaine" were required to act under Section 4.2.
(Def. Br. at 29). Defendants' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of Section

4841-3106-0743.1
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4.2 and would render the use of the word "each" wholly superfluous. The word "each" is
a distributive pronoun defined as "being one of two or more distinct individuals having a
similar relation and often constituting an aggregate." Merriam-Webster's Online,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/each (last visited October 26, 2010). l It is
in used in contradistinction to "all." "Ourselves" is defined as those identical to us. Id. at
/ourselves.

Consequently, although Section 4.2 refers to the trustors ("ourselves") as a

group, the use of the word "each" clearly indicates that one member of the group, i.e.,
Blaine or Shirley, could withdraw the Property at any time. This is consistent with the
remainder of the provision, which requires notice to "one or more" of the trustees only if
the withdrawing trustor is not then serving as a trustee. The interpretation urged by
Defendants is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation and should be rejected. See
Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraetner, LLC, 2009 UT 7, \ 15, 210 P.3d 263; Cafe
Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gijford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ^ 25, 207 P.3d 1235.3

A distributive pronoun considers each member of a group separately, rather than
collectively. Id. at /distributive pronoun.
2

In interpreting contracts, the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given
effect, which ordinary meaning is often best determined through standard, non-legal
dictionaries. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass yn, 899 P.2d 779, 782
(Utah Ct. App. 1995 (citations omitted).
3

Nor do Sections 4.5 and 4.7 of the Trust Agreement support Defendants' interpretation.
(Def. Br. at 29). Section 4.5 refers to "either" Blaine or Shirley and "the other" trustees.
And there is nothing in Section 4.7 that requires joint action. It simply requires a trustor
to deliver written notice of an exercise of a reserved power to a trustee unless otherwise
4841-3106-0743.1
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Defendants' proposed interpretation also ignores the repeated use of plural pronouns such
as "we" to refer to a single trustor or trustee. For example, in Section 4.2, its states that
written notice is required only if "we" are not then serving as "a Trustee."
Pursuant to the plain language of Section 4.2, Shirley, as trustor, had actual
authority to execute the Warranty Deed whereby the Property was conveyed out of the
Trust and to Blaine and Shirley as joint tenants. Once removed, there is no question the
POA gave Shirley actual authority to execute the Trust Deed on behalf of Blaine in his
individual capacity. The Trust Deed is valid under Section 4.2 of the Trust Agreement.
IIL

SECTION 11.1 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT GAVE SHIRLEY ACTUAL
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE WARRANTY DEED.
Shirley also had actual authority to execute the Warranty Deed as trustee of the

Trust pursuant to Section 11.1 of the Trust Agreement, which provides as follows:
Without regard to any legal restrictions otherwise applicable
to trustees, the Trustees are authorized to exercise the
following powers as well as any other powers conferred by
law, in their sole and absolute discretion.
* * *

(g)
To borrow money for any trust purpose and to pledge
all or part of the Trust Property to secure such borrowing
without incurring any personal liability therefor.

provided in the Trust Agreement. As stated above, Section 4.2 does not require written
notice to the trustee if the trustor is serving as a trustee.
4841-3106-0743.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

(See Add. 3) (emphasis added). Although the usual and ordinary meaning of "sole" is
"one person," Defendants argue that the "context" of Section 11.1 "evinces an opposite
intent" that both trustees were required to act. (Def. Br. at 30). This argument suffers
from the same defect as their Section 4.2 argument.
The Trust Agreement is a form-book agreement into which Blaine and Shirley's
financial planner inserted their names. Many of the provisions of the Trust Agreement
are simply not applicable and the plural "Trustees" is used in places where it is obvious
that the singular "Trustee" is intended. (See, e.g., Sections 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 8.1,
9.1, and 9.2). As Shirley testified, she had no intent with respect to whether they were
required to act together or alone under the Trust Agreement generally or Section 11.1
specifically. Blaine and Shirley did not discuss this issue with each other when they
executed the Trust Agreement. (R. 1385 at 68, 75). Blaine did not pay any attention to
Section 11.1 when he executed the Trust Agreement, much less discuss it or have an
understanding of it. (R. 1386 at 124). Nor were they told by their financial planner or
their attorney that they had to act jointly under the Trust Agreement. (R. 1385 at 65).
Indeed, Defendants do not dispute that if there was a "joint action" requirement, they
ignored it without exception, whether Shirley was writing checks or Blaine was signing
the Settlement Agreement between the Chapter 7 Trustee and the Trust in the Bankruptcy
Action. (R. at 1385 at 65-66; Tr. Ex. 48). The Trust Deed is valid under Section 11.1.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IV.

SHIRLEY'S EXECUTION OF THE WARRANTY DEED AND TRUST DEED
WAS NOT A GRATUITUOUS TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY NOR DID IT
REVOKE OR MODIFY THE TRUST.
There is no limitation on Shirley's authority in the POA. Defendants previously

conceded the POA authorized Shirley to sign Blaine's name in his individual capacity.
(R. 447, 697). Defendants do not rebut Franklin's argument that neither the Trust
Agreement nor Utah law would have prevented Shirley from executing the Warranty
Deed on behalf of Blaine as trustee pursuant to the POA. Nor do Defendants dispute that
the trial court's ruling was not based on an analysis of the plain language of the POA or
Utah law but rather a mistaken belief, unsupported by any evidence presented at trial, that
Bank One "required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific property" for the loan.
Instead, Defendants argue that the POA nevertheless "did not authorize what
Shirley did, either for Blaine personally or the trust" because it could not be used to
"make a gift" and that Shirley's execution of the Warranty Deed and Trust Deed was
somehow a "gratuitous transfer" of the Property. (Def. Br. at 17, 19). The premise of
this argument is fundamentally flawed because Shirley's execution of the Warranty Deed
and Trust Deed was not a "gift" to herself or a third party. Blaine and Shirley - the
trustors, trustees, and beneficiaries - received $247,000 in loan proceeds in exchange for
the Trust Deed. This is not "nominal consideration," The loan proceeds were also used
to benefit another asset of the Trust, Hanney & Hanney.

4841-3106-0743.1
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Further, withdrawing the Property from the Trust or encumbering the Property is
not "amending" or "revoking" the Trust Agreement. If so, every time a check was
written by the Blaine or Shirley, it would constitute an amendment or revocation of the
Trust Agreement. Consequently, Defendants' reliance on Huntsman v. Huntsman, 192 P.
368 (Utah 1920), Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246, and Kline v. Utah Dept of Health,
776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), is misplaced. Even if the execution of the Warranty
Deed was somehow a revocation of the Trust, Shirley had the right to do so because "the
right to revoke a trust in whole or in part is recognized as one of the inherent rights of the
settlor." In re Estate of West, 915 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
V.

THE TRUST DEED IS VALID PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §75-7-406.
Defendants do not dispute that the Trust Deed is valid pursuant to the former Utah

Code Ann. §75-7-406, which was in effect in 2000:
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or
assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the
existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is
not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is
properly exercising the power; and a third person, without
actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his power or
improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with
the trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised
the powers he purports to exercise . . .
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 (emphasis added) (2003). Section 75-7-406 was repealed in
2004 and replaced with §75-7-1012, not §75-7-816 as stated by Defendants. Thus,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Bank One's alleged knowledge of the existence of the Trust pursuant to the Commitment
for Title Insurance is not relevant. (Def. Br. at 28, fn. 10). The only knowledge that
would be relevant is actual knowledge that Shirley's actions in withdrawing the Property
from the Trust or executing the Trust Deed exceeded her authority as trustee. Defendants
do not dispute that Franklin lacked such actual knowledge. Accordingly, the Trust Deed
is valid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406.
VI.

SHIRLEY HAD IMPLIED AND/OR APPARENT AUTHORITY,
Shirley had implied and/or apparent authority to execute the Warranty Deed and

the Trust Deed. Shirley had implied authority because obtaining the loans was incidental
to the absolute authority which Blaine delegated to her. Specifically, Blaine delegated to
Shirley complete authority for all of their financial affairs. Her implied authority is not
based solely on the POA, although it is further evidence of Blaine's delegation of
authority.4 (Def. Br. at 26). Nor is Bank One's alleged lack of knowledge of, or reliance
on, the POA relevant to an implied authority determination. (Id. at 26-27). Indeed, as
Blaine's spouse, Shirley is considered to have implied authority to act as an agent for
Blaine because their agency relationship is supported by facts and circumstances beyond

There is no requirement that Shirley have a "subjective belief that she had implied
authority. In any event, Defendants' assertion that Shirley did not have a subjective
belief that the "power of attorney was usable" is contrary to her testimony at trial.
Shirley testified that she "knew" she could use it to obtain the loans after using it to
obtain the Key Bank loan. (R. 1385 at 129).
4841-3106-0743.1
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their marital relationship. Like the husband in Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001
UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, Shirley handled the financial aspects of the marriage and Blaine did
not take "an active role" in managing or monitoring his financial affairs. Consequently,
Shirley's knowledge is imputed to Blaine and he should not be allowed to "disavow
knowledge of the events surrounding [the transactions at issue] simply because [his wife]
handled [his] business for [him]." See Macris at \ 23; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-8
("husband or wife may constitute the other his or her attorney in fact to control and
dispose of his or her property for their mutual benefit or otherwise, and may revoke the
appointment the same as other persons").
As for Shirley's apparent authority, Blaine certainly "contributed to the formation
of a belief that she was his agent and was cloaked with authority to sign his name on
important legal documents and otherwise handle all of his financial affairs. See Workers'
Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, fflf 10-11, 210 P.3d 277 (apparent
authority exists when principal contributes to formation of belief that individual was
principal's agent or when principal knowingly permits presumptive agent to assume the
exercise of such authority).

A*A\.'\\(\f>jmA'\
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VII.

SHIRLEY WAS NOT A "THIEF" NOR WAS SHE "SELF-DEALING."
Defendants' attempt to label Shirley as a "thief is also unavailing. (Def. Br. at

31).

As Blaine repeatedly testified at trial, Shirley was a joint owner of the Property?

She helped pay for the lot and for the house that was built on the lot. She helped pay for
the insurance and real property taxes for the Property. She was trustor, trustee, and
beneficiary of the Trust. The cases cited by Defendants in support of their "thief
argument are equally unpersuasive. For example, in The Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, the issue was whether a
constructive trust could be imposed on two automobiles given to Jolley by an employee
of the LDS Church who had used embezzled funds to purchase the vehicles. The Utah
Supreme Court held that a constructive trust may be impressed upon stolen or embezzled
money. 467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970). This is not the situation presented in this case.
Nor can Shirley be characterized as a "self-dealing" trustee. She obtained the
loans to pay the debts and obligations of Hanney & Hanney, a purported asset of the
Trust, and to repay Hanney Development. Although perhaps misguided, Shirley was
attempting to act in the best interests of Blaine, as her husband and as an officer and
director of Hanney & Hanney, and the Trust. Even if Shirley breached her duty of
loyalty, the Trust Deed is not voidable under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 because this
Indeed, Blaine admitted at trial that he never asked that criminal charges be filed
against Shirley for any of the transactions at issue in this case. (R. 1386 at 100).
4X41-1106-07411
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provision is subject to "the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as
provided in Section 75-7-1012."
VIII. DEFENDANTS RATIFIED THE TRUST DEED.
Defendants ratified the Trust Deed. Defendants make four arguments against
ratification.

First, Defendants argue Franklin failed to satisfy its marshaling burden.

(Def. Br. at 33). Second, Defendants argue there was no evidence Blaine intended to
"ratify any of Shirley's wrongful acts." (Id. at 34). Third, Defendants argue Blaine
"never had full knowledge of all the facts." (Id.). And finally, Defendants argue there
was no "written ratification." (Id.). These arguments are without merit.
Franklin marshaled all evidence presented at trial supporting the trial court's
ratification decision, including evidence not cited in the Memorandum Decision. For
example, Franklin cited Shirley's testimony that when Blaine asked to look at bank
records, she told him that the records were at the accountant's office. Franklin also cited
Blaine's testimony that he lost "several hundred thousand dollars" as a result of Shirley's
acts. (PL Br. at 44-45). Indeed, Defendants fail to identify any supporting evidence not
identified in Franklin's opening brief.
The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that Blaine had the requisite intent
and knowledge to ratify the Warranty Deed and Trust Deed. At the time he signed the
Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action and his amended 2002 tax return, he knew all of the
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facts and circumstances surrounding the Trust Deed. Blaine's willful ignorance of all the
information that would have been revealed if he had simply bothered to review hi~ own
tax returns does not allow him to escape ratification. He cannot "disavow knowledge" of
the loans simply because Shirley handled his financial affairs for him. See Maoris, supra,
2001 UT 43, % 23 (wife cannot disavow knowledge of events surrounding cancellation of
stock simply because her husband handled her business for her); cf. Whitehead v.
Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (wife jointly liable for tax liens
because she knew withholding taxes were not being paid, she shared the benefits derived
from spending the employees' withholdings, and she had the power to correct the
situation as a co-owner).
With respect to Defendants' fourth argument, Utah law does not require Blaine's
ratification to be in writing.6 Indeed, such a requirement would eviscerate Utah case law
holding that a principal may "impliedly" ratify an agreement by silence, acquiescence,
failure to promptly disaffirm, and/or retention of the fruits of the agreement. See Moses
v. Archie McFarland & Son, 230 P.2d 571, 574 (Utah 1951); Lowe v. April Indus,, Inc.,
531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1974); Zions First Nat'I Bank v: ClarkClinic Corp., 762 P.2d
6

In Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982), the presumptive agent entered
into an oral contract for the sale of two parcels of land owned by defendants. The Utah
Supreme Court held that there was no ratification as a matter of law because the Utah
Statute of Frauds states that every contract for the lease or sale of any interest in lands is
void unless the contract is in writing signed by the lawful agent of the party by whom the
sale is to be made. In this case, there was no contract for the lease or sale of the Property.
4841-3106-0743.1
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1090, 1099 (Utah 1988). Even if there was such a requirement, Blaine's ratification of
Shirley's authority was in writing. Not only did he sign the POA, he also signed the
Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action and his amended 2002 tax return. (R. 1385 at 240;
1386 at 170-72; Tr. Exs. 40 and 43).
Defendants' assertion there is not a "scintilla of evidence" that Blaine had
personally liability for any Hanney & Hanney debt or obligation also is incorrect. Blaine
included all of Hanney & Hanney's debts and obligations on his Schedules in the
Bankruptcy Action and identified them as "joint obligations." (Tr. Ex. 43, attached to PL
Br. as Addendum 1). Finally, the evidence at trial demonstrated that Blaine received
significant benefits as result of the loans, including the repayment of the $45,000
borrowed from their joint savings account, the $50,000 per year salary of Shirley, the
repayment of some of the "loans" Shirley obtained from Hanney Development, and the
mortgage interest deductions on their federal and state income tax returns. Defendants'
assertion that there was somehow no "benefit" or "unjust enrichment" as a result of the
mortgage interest deduction because "mortgage interest was paid to Bank One" is
similarly incorrect. (Def. Br. at 36). The interest payments under the loans, including the
Bank One loan, were made from Hanney & Hanney's account, not Blaine and Shirley's
personal account. (See, e.g., Tr. Ex. 56). Blaine cannot have it both ways. In addition,

d»Ai_iin£-n74i i
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the loans were booked as loans of Hanney & Hanney, which offset its income and
resulted in losses which were then deducted from Blaine and Shirley's individual income
tax returns. (Tr. Exs. 31-42). Defendants ratified the Trust Deed.
IX,

ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRUST DEED IS A VALID LIEN ON SHIRLEY'S
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
Despite the fact that Blaine and Shirley paid for the undeveloped lot from their

joint funds, built the house on the lot with money they had saved together, and paid for
the real property taxes from their joint account to which they both contributed,
Defendants argue that Shirley "had no interest in the house which was transferrable."
(Def. Br. at 15). Despite the fact that the Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action, which
were signed by Blaine under penalty of perjury and with the advice of legal counsel, refer
to the Property as jointly owned, Defendants claim that Shirley had no interest "which
any creditor's claim could attach." Despite the fact that Shirley was identified as a
"grantor" on the Special Warranty Deed and as a joint owner of the Property on two
easements deeds recorded in 1979, the Davis County tax records, and the homeowner's
insurance, Defendants argue that Shirley's interest "was merely an expectancy." (Def.
Br. at 16). Shirley's interest in the Property, however, does not derive from her status as
Blaine's wife. Shirley was a joint owner of the Property.
She also possessed an equitable interest in the Property at the time she executed
the Trust Deed. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307, 308 (Utah 1988) (if a

ASIA 1-1106.0741 1
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spouse has by her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or
protection of property, such spouse acquires an equitable interest in such property).
Under Utah law, an equitable interest can be encumbered by a lien or trust deed. See
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983) (citing Lockhart Co. v. Anderson,
Utah, 646 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1982)) (an equitable interest can be the subject of a
mortgage as well as a trustee's sale); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 75(c) & (e) (1949); cf
Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Butler v.
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987)) (under doctrine of equitable conversion, buyer
under a uniform real estate contract "obtains an equitable interest in the land itself, even
though the [seller] retains the legal title" and such equitable interest is an "interest in real
property to which judgment liens may attach as to any other real property interest...").
Finally, Defendants cite Wyoming and Kansas cases to support their argument that
"during marriage, property in one spouse's name is not exposed to the other spouse's
creditors."7 (Def. Br. at 14-15). These cases are inconsistent with Defendants' position
that the Property was an asset of the Trust. Indeed, at the time the divorce action was
filed, the Property was not "separate property" held in the name of Blaine.
7

Thus, the

The Nielson v. Thompson case cited by Defendants is not on point and conflicts with
Utah law. In Nielsen, the issue was whether a judgment creditor of one of the spouses
could intervene in a divorce proceeding to attempt to collect on its judgment against the
non-party spouse. 982 P.2d. 709, 710 (Wyo. 1999). The property in question was the
separate property of the spouse, who was not obligated under the judgment lien. There
was no claim that marital property was involved.
/foxi -iiA/- m x i 1
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Wyoming and Kansas cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable. Further, Defendants
"concede" that upon the commencement of the divorce action, the Property was a marital
asset." (Def. Br. at 14). Thus, even if Shirley's interest in the Property was inchoate, her
interest vested on February 11, 2005, the date she filed the divorce action. See Nielson at
710 (spouse's inchoate interest vests upon filing of divorce complaint). On that date, the
Trust Deed became a lien on the Shirley's interest in the Property pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-20, which provides that "[a]ll right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust
property acquired by the trustor . . . subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, shall
inure to the trustee as security for the obligation or obligations for which the trust
property is conveyed as if acquired before execution of the trust deed."
X,

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS1 CROSS APPEAL.
Defendants' cross appeal is much ado about nothing because Franklin is not

required to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed. Even if it were, the principal amount due
and owing under the Trust Deed has never been in dispute. Indeed, Franklin filed the
Motion to Re-Open only as a precautionary measure because Defendants raised the issue
in their post-trial brief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Motion.
A.

Franklin Is Not Required to Judicially Foreclose the Trust Deed.

Franklin is not required to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed simply because it
included a claim for judicial foreclosure in the First Amended Complaint.

The "single

point" of this action was not, as stated by Defendants, Franklin's "desire for judicial
A*A\JM(\&J\mIA.'\ 1
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foreclosure." (Def. Br. at 37). The "single point" of this action was to establish the
validity of the Trust Deed as a lien on the Property. As asserted by Defendants in their
Counterclaim, u a real case and controversy exists regarding the validity of the Bank One
Deed of Trust." (R. 59). All of the discovery and the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment focused on the central issue of whether the Trust Deed is a valid lien on the
Property. The amount due and owing under the Trust Deed was not even identified as a
controverted issue for trial in the Joint Final Pre-Trial Order. (R. 994-1035).
If the trial court ruled that the Trust Deed was valid, Franklin would have had the
right to complete its non-judicial foreclosure even if the trial court denied the Motion or
declined to order a judicial foreclosure of the Tmst Deed. A non-judicial foreclosure of
the Trust Deed was commenced on February 13, 2003 with the recording of a Notice of
Default.

(R. 1386 at 178-80).

bankruptcy.

A few weeks later, Blaine and Shirley filed for

When Bank One sought relief from the automatic stay to complete its

foreclosure, Defendants asserted the Trust Deed was not a valid lien on Blaine's one-half
interest in the Property.8 (Tr. Ex. 44). Consequently, Franklin was forced to file this
action to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Trust Deed was a valid lien on Blaine's
interest in the Property. In addition to its claims for declaratory judgment, equitable
estoppel, ratification, and equitable lien, Franklin also included a claim for judicial
8

Defendants did not challenge the validity of the Trust Deed on Shirley's one-half
interest in the Property until this action was filed.
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foreclosure as a matter of practice. (R. 29-40). By doing so, Franklin did not somehow
waive its right to complete the non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed if it chose to do
so. Indeed, Franklin never cancelled the Notice of Default.
B.

At Trial, Franklin Was Not Required to Introduce Evidence of the
Undisputed Principal Amount Due and Owing Under the Trust Deed.

Even if it decided to proceed with a judicial foreclosure, Franklin was not required
to introduce evidence at trial regarding the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed.
The parties signed and filed a Joint Final Pre-Trial Order on January 26, 2009 which set
forth the "controverted facts/issues55 for trial. Defendants did not include the amount due
and owing under the Trust Deed as a controverted fact or issue. Indeed, the principal
amount due and owing under the Trust Deed has never been in dispute and the parties
implicitly reserved the issue of the amount of interest and attorney fees and costs for
future determination. This made sense because interest would continue to accrue and
attorney fees and costs would continue to be incurred until the issue of the validity of the
Trust Deed was resolved. If the trial court determined that the Trust Deed was valid,
Franklin could then present by affidavit the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed.
If Defendants disagreed with how interest was calculated, or the reasonableness of the
attorney fees and costs incurred by Franklin, they would have had the opportunity to
object prior to the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure. Moreover, there is nothing in
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901 et seq. or the case law cited by Defendants requiring such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence to be presented at trial. The Jewkes case cited by Defendants simply refers to
evidence in the record. See Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488
(Utah 1984) (awarded judgment must be based on "evidence in the record.").
Further, Franklin did present evidence at trial of the principal amount due and
owing under the Trust Deed after Shirley stopped making payments. In Trial Exhibit 59,
which was prepared by Shirley for her accountant after her activities came to light in
February 2003, the principal amount due and owing under the Trust Deed is stated as
$245,590.25. (See Trial Exhibit 59, attached as Appendix L to Def. Br.). This is the
same principal amount stated by Franklin in its Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures and
Supplemental Response to Defendants' Second Set of Discovery Requests.9 (R. 1227-32;
1046-47, attached hereto as Addenda 1 and 2). Shirley also testified at trial that the
interest rate on the Bank One loan was 9.5% per annum. (R. 1385 at 16). Shirley further
testified the Bank One loan was in default and she has not made any payments on it since
November 2002. (Id. at 17-18). This evidence is more than sufficient for a judgment.
Finally, Defendants have never identified any facts that would contradict Trial
Exhibit 59. Indeed, notably missing from Defendants' brief is any statement that they
actually dispute that the principal amount due and owing is $245,590.25 or that the
interest rate is 9.5%. Thus, the calculation of the amount of unpaid interest is a matter of
9

The Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures were filed on December 6, 2006. The Supplemental
Response was filed on February 4, 2009.
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simple math which does not require trial testimony or experts.

Similarly, evidence

regarding attorney fees and costs is more appropriately submitted to the trial court after a
ruling on the merits of the claims.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Re-Opening the Trial.

If there was a good faith dispute as to the principal amount due and owing or if
Franklin should have introduced evidence at trial of the amount of unpaid interest that has
accrued, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-opening the trial to allow
Franklin to introduce such evidence.

See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and

Heating v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (no abuse of discretion
in granting motion to re-open case to allow introduction of documents that were exhibits
to complaint); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1983)
(no abuse of discretion in re-opening case to receive additional evidence after court had
entered order in form of unsigned minute entry).
Defendants have not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the Motion. Instead, Defendants vaguely suggest that "unfair prejudice exists in
this case." (Def. Br. at 39). In support, Defendants state that Franklin "never revealed
any bank employee, witness, or document who would present the amount due under the
trust deed" and "waited until all the evidence had been submitted and arguments have
been made to correct a fundamental flaw in its case." (Id. at 39-40). Defendants also
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state that Franklin did not offer an explanation as to why it did not offer additional
evidence of the amount due and owing at trial.

{Id. at 40).

These unsupported

statements, even if true, would not render the trial court's decision an abuse of discretion.
These statements, however, are not accurate. Franklin did offer an explanation to the trial
court. (R. 1144-46). And, Franklin provided Defendants with a computation of the
amounts due and owing under the Trust Deed with its Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.
(R. 1227-32). This computation, which was attached as Exhibit B, stated the unpaid
principal balance was $245,590.25, the unpaid interest was $102,396.36 through
December 31, 2006, and the unpaid late fees were $547.42. The computation further
stated that the October 13, 2002 payment had not been made and that the per diem was
$63.92. Franklin provided Defendants with an updated computation in January 2009,
which showed that the amount of unpaid accrued interest had increased to $150,977.26.
At no time prior to trial did Defendants conduct any discovery related to
Franklin's computation. Defendants never sought to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
of Bank One or Franklin.

Defendants did not identify any experts to challenge the

application of payments or the calculation of interest under the Bank One loan.
Defendants did not deem it necessary to file any pleadings or request any hearings on the
computation prior to the trial, at which they were presumably expecting to dispute the
amount due and owing.
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Defendants did not ask Shirley any questions about her
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payments or Franklin's computation. The reason for this is obvious: the interest rate and
the principal amount due and owing have never been in dispute in this case.
Importantly, Defendants fail to explain how they would be disadvantaged by the
trial court's re-opening of the trial to allow Franklin to correct this alleged "fundamental
flaw." See Ross v. Leftwich, 377 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1963) (plaintiffs immediate
motion to re-open to provide proof should have been granted because it was timely made
and would not have placed defendants to a disadvantage). The trial court appropriately
recognized that it would be inequitable and unjust to preclude Franklin from introducing
additional evidence as to the amount due and owing if Defendants continued to insist that
such additional evidence was required. See Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784
(Utah 1980) (motion to reopen case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court but
such discretion may not be exercised in a capricious and arbitrary manner which
produces an inequitable or unjust result).

Given Franklin's right to proceed with a non-

judicial foreclosure, the trial court's decision is just and fair for both Franklin and
Defendants.

Indeed, Defendants spend three pages in their brief complaining about

possible "prejudice" to their redemption rights.

(Def. Br. at 42-44).

This alleged

prejudice, however, would not be the result of re-opening the trial. It would be the result
of not re-opening the trial. If Defendants have a good faith basis for disputing the
principal amount due and owing under the Trust Deed or the interest rate - which they
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have yet to articulate in any pleading or brief- then re-opening the trial to allow them to
challenge such amount prior to a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure would protect their
interests.
Nor are the cases cited by Defendants helpful to their position.

Unlike the

defendant in Lewis, Franklin did not absent itself from trial. See Lewis v. Porter, 556
P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976). Unlike the plaintiff in Bekins Bar V Ranch, Franklin did not
wait until after the trial court ruled on the merits of its claims to move to re-open the trial.
See Bekins Bar VRanch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah 1982) (For
the first time on appeal, plaintiff alleged there was no valid delivery of a deed. In
affirming, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[pjrior to the court's ruling, plaintiff never
amended its pleading in any way to assert lack of delivery. . . Once both parties have
rested and the court has ruled on the sufficiency of plaintiff s case it is simply too late to
inject a new issue into the case.").
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision to allow Franklin to introduce
additional evidence as to the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed if the trial
court, in its discretion, determines that such additional evidence is required in order for
Franklin to proceed with its judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed.
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CONCLUSION
Franklin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Memorandum Decision
and Judgment. Franklin further requests that this Court deny Defendants' cross appeal.
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed, Franklin requests that it receive its attorney fees
and costs incurred on appeal
DATED this 27th day of October, 2010.

LAURA S. SCOTT
MATTHEW D. COOK
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant and
Cross Appellee
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Brad C.Smith
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Management
Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 26(A)(1) INITIAL
DISCLOSURES

Plaintiff,
Case No. 050700241
vs.

Judge Rodney S. Page

BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual;
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual;
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and 1
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a revocable
trust,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Franklin Credit Management Corporation ("Plaintiff') makes the following
initial disclosures based upon information currently and reasonably available:

16230.002/884177.1
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1.

Identities of the Individuals Likely to Have Discoverable Information. Plaintiff

identifies the following individuals as likely to have discoverable information supporting its
claims and defenses:
Blaine J. Hanney
Contact through Ben Rasmussen, counsel for Mr. Hanney
Subjects: All subjects
Shirley A. Hanney
80 South Orange Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Subjects: All subjects
Erik K. Iverson
5562 South 150 East
Ogden, UT
(801)475-4798
Subjects: Bank One Trust Deed
Stephen M. Enderton
234 East 3900 South, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
(801)281-0252
Subjects: Bankruptcy schedules filed by the Hanneys
Henry Vantienderen
7001 South 900 East, Suite 240
Midvale, UT 84047
(801)262-3596
Subjects: Tax returns filed by the Hanneys
Mark Shepard
Contact through George W. Pratt, counsel for American General
Subjects: Subordination of American General Trust Deed
David E. Shelton
692 East 3050 North
North Ogden, UT 84414
Subjects: Power of Attorney dated February 22, 1995

16230.002/884177.1
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Carol W. Kap
742 Taylor Ave
Ogden, UT 84404
(801)394-6006
Subject: Tax returns filed by the Hanneys
John H. Geilmann
1600 W. Towne Center Drive
South Jordan, UT 84095
(801)254-3742
Subjects: The Hanney Family Trust
Shelley M Lewis
P.O. Box 16430
Boise, ID 83715
Subjects: Reconveyance of KeyBank Trust Deed.
Kasey L, Eaton
Twentieth Century Mortgage
180 East 2100 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801)493-0179
Subjects: Bank One loan
Inwest Title Services, Inc.
471 West Heritage Park Blvd, Suite 6
Layton, UT 84041
(801)773-9806
Subjects: Disbursement of proceeds of Bank One loan
2.

Relevant Documents,

Relevant, non-privileged documents in

Plaintiffs

possession, custody or control that support its claims and defenses are attached hereto as Exhibit
A. Plaintiffs claims and defenses are also supported by the pleadings, schedules, exhibits,
deposition transcripts and other documents filed in Bankruptcy Case No. 03-24754 and/or
Adversary Case No. 052133.
3.

J 6230.002/884177.1

Damages. Plaintiffs computation of damages is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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Plaintiff is also seeking to recover its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the

!f

Bank One loan, which have yet to be determined.

C:t

*'

g
4.
Insurance Agreements. Stewart Title Guaranty Company issued a lender's title
e* insurance policy, Policy No. M-9994-5085620, to Plaintiffs assignor, Bank One, N.A. A copy
of the lender's policy is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
DATED this (jl^day

of December, 2006.

^L.

JOHN B. WILSON
LAURA S. SCOTT
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I[)e< :iei nbei 08, 2006
BLAINE! J HANNEY
3037 E! 3050 NORTH
L AYTOM UT 84040

i

Payoff figures have been requested on the loan for the borrower-arid p r o p e l described below.
Loan ID! 0014023159
j
BLAINd J HANNEY, 529667867
!
SHIRLEY A HANNEY, 528669718
\
3037 E^ST 3050 NORTH
|
LAYTOfs!,UT 84040
}
I oan Type: Conventional
j
All payoff proceeds must be in the form of guaranteed certified funds. When remitting funds,
please use our loan number to insure proper posting and provide us with the borrower's
forwarding address. Funds received In this office after 12:00 noon will be processed on the
next business day, with interest charged to that date. Pay offs submitted to an
inappropriate address may be subject to additional interest, late charges and may be
reported delinquent to all major credit agencies.
j

Express Payments / Over Night
Franklin Credit Payoff Department
110 East Main Street
Saiineyille, Ohio 43945
Attention: Barb Webb

Other Pay Off
Franklin Credit Payoff Department
P.O. Box 205.
Salineville, Ohio 43945
Attention: Barb Webb

All payoff figures are subject to clearance of funds in transit The payoff is subject, to final audit
when presented. Any overpayment or refunds will be mailed directly to the borrower, We m ill
prepare ,the release of our interest in the property after all funds have cleared.
i
i
Projected Payoff Date
12/31/2006
principal Balance
Merest to 12/31/2006
Fees
(Prepayment Penalty
Release Fees
[Funds owed by Borrower
|Funds owed to Borrower
Total Payoff

$245,590.25
$102,396.36
$ '547.42
: $0.00
$! 25.00
$0.00
! $0.00

$348,559.03

Per diem
.
$! 63.92
The next payment due is 10/13/2002. Payments are made by Billing on a Monthly basis. The
current interest rate is 9.5000% and the P & I payment is $2,082;84.
PLEASE CALL THE NUMBER LISTED BELOW TO UPDATE FIGURES PRIOR TO
REMITTING FUNDS AS THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE.

I

"

j

1-800-255-5897

POI
12/6/2006!
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DISTRICT COURT

j

JOHN B.WILSON (3511)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Management
Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
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Facsimile: (801) 536-611.1

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
\NKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
-.r)daw;ir- -ornontli.-i*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECOND
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS

H-'PORATTOV

i'lamtiff,
vs.
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual;
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual;
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation: .. ,
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a ro ocabk
trust,

Case No. 050700241
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.

I hereby certify that on this jJJ^Z

;

^ -- February, 2009, I caused to be mailed, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO

miT
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imisrs

SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to:
Certificate of Service of PfaintfFs S u p p l e m e n t a l R s p o r

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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VD28039326
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pacjes: 2

Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
George W. Pratt
JONES WALDO HOI BROOK &
MCDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main Street. Suite 1500
Sal: Lal« Citv. TIT 84101
IMN

JOHN B. WILSON
LAURA S SCO I I
PARSON- Bl-i ILL & LATIMER
Atto-.-w ' • m i i " t i f f

084 • i'?-48ll-9il9-«-1(' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JOHN B.WILSON (3511)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Credit
Management Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECOND
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS

BLAlNli J. HANNLX, an individual;
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual;
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a revocable
trust,

Case No. 050700241
ludge Rodney S. Page

-»uenu.Li!

I.until! Franklin Credit Managemeni ( orporation t Franklin""- Hereby supplements its
response f

,.• ;<......-.:.

IMJ.A

.-. .

Discovery Requests ("Discovery Requests") as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Franklin hereby incorporates its General Objections as set forth in Plaintiffs Responses

Requests served on January 28, 2009.
Fi anklin hei eby supplen lents its Response to Request f 4'o. 5 as follow s:
REQUEST NO, 5: Please provide an itemized description of all damages..
RESPONSE: Franklin incorporates its general obj^uion.*

i wOjeclnsiis.

hranUiit responds us follows Franklin's (iiinaj'cs, includes the unpaid principal, micicza ana iaic
fees under the Bank One Loan as well as its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in attempting to

31, 2009, the following amounts are due and owing under the Bank One Loan:
Unpaid »T it ., 4 i,J:

' $2- 15,590 25

Unpaid Interest.

$150,977.26

Unpaid Late Fees:

$

l||i

i.f(unices1 h r s ami ("ml i

142 42

1 HIl|

I) A ITU M l i i s ¥ _ da;> < >£ Febi i lai ) , 2009.

JOHN B.WILSON
I AURAS. SCOTT
NUNS Bi:iII H& LATIMER
Attorneys for I'lamtiff
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511)
LAURA S.SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Manama"'1'11
Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVKJL Ut
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECONI>
^ET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual;
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual;
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and
THE HANNEY FAMILV IT'i ^ r revocable
trust,

.udge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.

I liriehv d'Hilv lliiil mi llii, L/> ii»

'!

!

>f

i caused to be mailed, a uue

nnect cop

:,i ilu- foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO

.DANTS

I

SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to:
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Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403

George W. Pratt

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
V\ I'El) this H

I

day of February, 2009.

JOHN B. WILSON
LAURA S. SCOTT
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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